20 Questions About Russia

The threat of using nuclear weapons from Putin is likely an empty one, intended to intimidate rather than be acted upon. Even if Russia faces setbacks similar to past conflicts like Afghanistan, Putin might dig in his heels and persist in Ukraine. The prospect of effectively managing an occupation, especially with potential partisan resistance, is unclear. While some fear extreme measures like concentration camps, a peaceful resolution seems unlikely. At present, the likelihood of Putin using nuclear weapons seems low. Western sanctions and threats are challenging, as sanctions often increase but are hard to reduce.

Putin’s foreign policy is driven by multiple factors. NATO expansion is one concern, but not the sole motivation for his actions in Ukraine. Another key driver is his desire to restore Russia’s global status to its former superpower status, akin to the Tsarist or Soviet empires. Putin aims to reassert control over the post-Soviet space, not by recreating the Soviet Union, but by becoming the regional hegemon. This approach reflects an attempt to invoke World War II-era narratives and glorify past Russian power, appealing to older Russians’ sense of historical greatness.

Putin’s actions suggest a larger goal beyond just military conquest. His aim appears to be not only to take Kyiv and other key areas but also to remove Ukraine’s leadership and install a pro-Russian government. He seems to want to reintegrate Ukraine into Russia’s sphere politically, socially, economically, and culturally. However, there is a significant risk that in trying to achieve this, he may end up destroying Ukraine in the process, making his motivations complex and potentially self-defeating.

The Soviet military conducted over 450 nuclear tests in Kazakhstan, which was part of the Soviet Union. People living near the testing sites experienced significant suffering due to radiation exposure from these tests over the span of 40 years.
-Dr. Togzhan Kassenova, Senior Fellow with PISCES, Center for Policy Research

The Soviet Union, like other nuclear powers, showed little concern for civilians or testing personnel. In Kazakhstan, they neglected the well-being of local communities who depended on the land and livestock. The Soviet military prioritized achieving its testing goals over the health and safety of nearby residents.
-Dr. Togzhan Kassenova, Senior Fellow with PISCES, Center for Policy Research

Nuclear testing programs often targeted vulnerable communities, reflecting broader patterns of power rather than solely racial factors. While race plays a significant role in these power dynamics, the issue is more complex and involves various elements of power and decision-making.
-Dr. Togzhan Kassenova, Senior Fellow with PISCES, Center for Policy Research

Early on, it became clear to local people and government in Kazakhstan that radiation from Soviet nuclear tests was causing illness and death. However, the tightly controlled Soviet system prevented accurate diagnosis and hindered efforts to address the issue. Local leaders who spoke out were quickly silenced. It wasn’t until Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the 1980s that Kazakhstan gained more political freedom to challenge the nuclear testing program. This shift, combined with a key event in 1989 when information about radioactive gas venting became public, led to the formation of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk anti-nuclear movement. This large-scale movement, led by figures like Kriya Oja-Sulimanov, galvanized millions to protest and rally against nuclear tests, gaining international support and significantly impacting the fight against nuclear testing.
-Dr. Togzhan Kassenova, Senior Fellow with PISCES, Center for Policy Research

Decades after the Soviet nuclear tests in Kazakhstan ended, the impacts are still felt by the third and fourth generations. Children in villages near former testing sites continue to suffer from health issues like cancer and physical deformities, highlighting the long-term effects of radiation exposure. This ongoing suffering underscores the real human cost of nuclear weapons programs, a fact often overlooked by policymakers who discuss these issues in abstract terms. The stark contrast between the lived experiences of affected communities and the detached discussions of diplomats is deeply frustrating and underscores the need for a more empathetic and realistic approach to nuclear policy.
-Dr. Togzhan Kassenova, Senior Fellow with PISCES, Center for Policy Research

The Soviet nuclear tests were primarily conducted at two major sites: the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan and the Novaya Zemlya site in the Arctic. Additionally, the Soviets also carried out experiments with “peaceful nuclear explosions” in other locations, including Kazakhstan.
-Dr. Togzhan Kassenova, Senior Fellow with PISCES, Center for Policy Research

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia each inherited nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration preferred consolidating these weapons in Russia, the largest successor state, to ensure they were under one control. Although President Clinton had a positive relationship with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the support for Russia’s nuclear consolidation was more rhetorical than practical, particularly given the context of the ongoing conflicts and geopolitical tensions.
-Dr. Carol Saivetz, Senior Advisor, MIT Security Studies Program

Putin is deeply concerned with Russia’s status and views the collapse of the Soviet Union as a major political catastrophe, which he believes has diminished Russia’s standing as a global power. This perception may drive him to assert Russia’s influence aggressively. There is debate about whether his decision-making is rational or not; some argue he is rational but his reasoning is not well understood. Additionally, his isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic, with limited interaction and reliance on technology, may contribute to a distorted perspective or lack of accurate feedback, potentially affecting his decisions. This isolation could also mean that he is not receiving honest input from those around him.
-Dr. Carol Saivetz, Senior Advisor, MIT Security Studies Program

The concern about NATO is seen as part of a rhetoric and propaganda strategy, suggesting that NATO is a threat and that Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO is a major issue.
-Dr. Carol Saivetz, Senior Advisor, MIT Security Studies Program

In discussions about nuclear weapons and geopolitics, it’s crucial to remember the human impact: Russian and Ukrainian people are suffering greatly, with ongoing bombings and casualties. The suppression of accurate media coverage and proposals to draft protesters highlight the severe human cost of the conflict, emphasizing the need to keep the human element in focus.
-Dr. Carol Saivetz, Senior Advisor, MIT Security Studies Program

In the summer of 2020, after a contested election in Belarus where President Lukashenko declared victory despite widespread evidence of a rigged vote, massive protests erupted. Initially, it seemed Lukashenko might lose power, but he increasingly relied on Vladimir Putin for support. Since then, the previously nominal Union State treaty between Russia and Belarus has gained significance, with Lukashenko effectively trading Belarusian independence for Putin’s support. This move suggests that Belarus may become more integrated into Russia’s sphere of influence.
-Dr. Carol Saivetz, Senior Advisor, MIT Security Studies Program

Putin has used nuclear threats as a tool to intimidate, particularly demonstrated through nuclear exercises in Belarus, which showcase his control over the country. There are two types of nuclear threats: the use of long-range missiles and the risk associated with Ukraine’s 15 nuclear reactors and other facilities. While there is no evidence of Ukraine pursuing nuclear weapons, Putin’s threats may aim to deter NATO and the U.S. from intervening. Despite the threats, it’s cautiously believed that Putin is unlikely to actually use nuclear weapons, though the threats themselves are effective in complicating international responses.
-Dr. Elizabeth A. Wood, Professor of Russian and Soviet History, MIT Center for International

The core issue for Putin is not Ukraine’s democracy but its independence from Russia. Putin is infuriated by Ukraine’s decision to pursue its own path rather than join his Eurasian Union project. From Russia’s perspective, Ukraine is seen as a buffer state, either part of Russia or on its edge. This anger extends to Ukrainian President Zelensky for addressing Russian-leaning oligarchs in Ukraine. While some speculate about reassembling the Soviet Union, Putin’s primary goal seems to be enhancing Russia’s power. NATO concerns are not the central motivation; instead, it’s more about asserting Russian dominance and control.
-Dr. Elizabeth A. Wood, Professor of Russian and Soviet History, MIT Center for International

Putin’s motivations can be seen as a “toxic cocktail” with four main components:

Megalomania: Putin’s desire to be seen as a great leader, akin to historical figures like Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, adding territory and expanding Russia’s influence.

Lowered Sense of Fear and Compassion: His reduced concern for consequences, evident from his violent tactics in Chechnya and Syria, and a general disregard for the impact on civilians.

Grudges Against Ukraine: A deep resentment towards Ukraine’s independence and its president, Zelensky, who has challenged Russian influence.

Overconfidence: Belief that Russia can withstand international backlash and that the U.S. and Europe would not effectively counter his actions.

These elements combine to make negotiations and finding a resolution challenging, as Putin’s motives are driven by personal ambition, historical grievances, and a strong belief in Russia’s resilience.
-Dr. Elizabeth A. Wood, Professor of Russian and Soviet History, MIT Center for International

While it’s unlikely that Putin would use a nuclear weapon, given that Russia has around 6,000 warheads and no current reason for nuclear conflict, his threats serve to deter other nuclear powers from intervening. If a nuclear weapon were used in Kyiv, the immediate effect would be a massive fireball. In the following weeks and months, radioactive fallout would spread globally, as particles from the explosion could travel around the world.
-Dr. Jim Walsh, Senior Research Associate at MIT’s Security Studies Program

In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia is the only country involved that possesses nuclear weapons. Russia’s nuclear arsenal is extensive, with approximately 5,428 nuclear warheads. Ukraine does not have any nuclear weapons. Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal in the 1990s after the Soviet Union’s dissolution, following the Budapest Memorandum, which provided security assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia.
-Dr. Jim Walsh, Senior Research Associate at MIT’s Security Studies Program

The United States and Russia together control approximately 90% of the world’s nuclear arsenal. Out of a global total of about 12,000 nuclear weapons, each country has roughly 4,000 in their active military stockpiles. Additionally, both nations have at least 1,000 retired nuclear weapons each, possibly more.
-Dr. Jim Walsh, Senior Research Associate at MIT’s Security Studies Program

Yes. Russia has demonstrated the capability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can reach the US. The Russian arsenal includes various types of ICBMs with the range and technology necessary to deliver nuclear payloads across great distances.

The international community generally views Putin’s nuclear threats as a strategic move intended to deter other countries from intervening in the conflict or escalating the situation. Many see these threats as a form of psychological warfare designed to create fear and leverage in diplomatic negotiations. While the threats are taken seriously, there is widespread belief that actual use of nuclear weapons is unlikely due to the catastrophic consequences and the principle of mutual assured destruction that discourages nuclear escalation.

Beyond territorial control, Russia’s strategic goals include undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty, preventing its alignment with Western institutions like NATO and the EU, and reasserting Russia’s influence over the post-Soviet space. Russia aims to weaken Ukraine’s government, destabilize the region, and demonstrate its power and resolve to both domestic and international audiences. Additionally, Russia seeks to secure geopolitical leverage and possibly force Ukraine into a more favorable negotiation position.

The legacy of Soviet nuclear testing has significantly influenced nuclear policies in former Soviet states by instilling a strong awareness of the dangers and consequences of nuclear weapons. Countries like Kazakhstan, which experienced extensive nuclear testing, have adopted non-proliferation policies and have actively advocated for nuclear disarmament. The historical impact has led these nations to support international treaties aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation and to prioritize regional and global security measures.

Domestic politics play a crucial role in shaping Russia’s foreign policy decisions, including its approach to Ukraine. Political leaders use foreign policy actions to bolster their domestic standing, appeal to nationalistic sentiments, and distract from internal issues. In Russia, the government often leverages foreign conflicts to consolidate political power, suppress dissent, and rally public support. The conflict in Ukraine is used to project strength and unify the population around a common external adversary, reinforcing the regime’s authority and diverting attention from domestic challenges.