FAQ

The threat of using nuclear weapons from Putin is likely an empty one, intended to intimidate rather than be acted upon. Even if Russia faces setbacks similar to past conflicts like Afghanistan, Putin might dig in his heels and persist in Ukraine. The prospect of effectively managing an occupation, especially with potential partisan resistance, is unclear. While some fear extreme measures like concentration camps, a peaceful resolution seems unlikely. At present, the likelihood of Putin using nuclear weapons seems low. Western sanctions and threats are challenging, as sanctions often increase but are hard to reduce.

Putin’s foreign policy is driven by multiple factors. NATO expansion is one concern, but not the sole motivation for his actions in Ukraine. Another key driver is his desire to restore Russia’s global status to its former superpower status, akin to the Tsarist or Soviet empires. Putin aims to reassert control over the post-Soviet space, not by recreating the Soviet Union, but by becoming the regional hegemon. This approach reflects an attempt to invoke World War II-era narratives and glorify past Russian power, appealing to older Russians’ sense of historical greatness.

Putin’s actions suggest a larger goal beyond just military conquest. His aim appears to be not only to take Kyiv and other key areas but also to remove Ukraine’s leadership and install a pro-Russian government. He seems to want to reintegrate Ukraine into Russia’s sphere politically, socially, economically, and culturally. However, there is a significant risk that in trying to achieve this, he may end up destroying Ukraine in the process, making his motivations complex and potentially self-defeating.

A second-strike capability means that a country maintains the capacity to use nuclear weapons, even if it suffers a nuclear attack. For example, a country whose homeland was destroyed by nuclear weapons might nevertheless be able to guarantee its ability to deliver a retaliatory strike from nuclear-armed submarines at sea. A secure second-strike capability is thought to enhance nuclear deterrence. A potential attacker knows that he too will be destroyed, even if he launches a successful surprise attack.

A ballistic missile is a delivery platform that can transport a nuclear warhead to a target. Like other delivery platforms (e.g., a plane), the “weapon” in the nuclear weapon is the warhead which carries enormous destructive power. A ballistic missile can, in principle, carry either a nuclear or a traditional (conventional) explosive. “Ballistic” refers to its flight path and is distinguished from cruise missiles, for example, which are powered and travel a largely flat trajectory. A ballistic missile, by contrast, follows a sloping upward curve, followed by a descent.

An ICBM, or inter-continental ballistic missile, is a type of ballistic missile or delivery platform that can travel extremely long, even cross-continental, distances to carry a payload to a target. Other ballistic missiles cover shorter distances, such as short-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In principle, an ICBM can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, though, in practice, ICBMs have been primarily a nuclear weapons platform.

Emerging research suggests that even a “small” nuclear war could have catastrophic climate effects, as well as regional destruction and global economic dislocation. A nuclear war anywhere will affect people everywhere, and depending on the circumstances, could lead to an extinction event. For example, if 20 years from now, India and Pakistan or China and Russia fight a large-scale nuclear war, every other country would confront a potential civilization-ending scenario, despite not being involved in the conflict. For the United States, its nuclear weapons stockpile cannot prevent or deter other countries from fighting their own nuclear war.

The good news is that this terrible outcome is preventable. Countries have dismantled nuclear weapons before. In fact, the US and Russia have taken apart about 65,000 nuclear warheads. Nuclear agreements have reduced the number of nuclear tests, the number of nuclear weapons, and the rate of proliferation. Countries can choose to reduce nuclear threats. So while nuclear dangers have increased in recent years, nothing prevents governments from doing what has worked in the past.

The United States did use nuclear weapons twice in Japan during World War II, and historians point to several crises during the Cold War in which the use of nuclear weapons was actively considered, most notably during the Cuban Missile Crisis. At least 7 of the 9 countries currently armed with nuclear weapons have nuclear doctrines that provide for the use of nuclear weapons in response to losses on a conventional battlefield. This means they are willing to use nuclear weapons first in a major war. In recent years, Russia, North Korea, and the United States have all threatened the use of nuclear weapons against their adversaries.

Experts also point to circumstances, particularly in crises, where leaders can face incentives to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict, particularly if they are the weaker party and already at risk of losing everything. And these situations do not include the additional possibilities that come with error, misperception, organizational failure, and other problems in nuclear decision-making.

History proves that the public can have a very powerful influence on nuclear weapons decisions. In fact, it looks like it is difficult to achieve progress against nuclear threats unless the public cares and is engaged. Other factors also matter or can be more important than public opinion, but governments tend to avoid making hard decisions if they can, and these are hard decisions. Without a push from the public, governments pass the nuclear problem off to the future, making it even harder to resolve.

Public engagement was especially strong in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Fears about the effects of above-ground nuclear testing focused public attention on nuclear weapons and nuclear war. Again in the 1980s, concern about a potential US-Soviet nuclear conflict sparked public concern. Both periods were followed by a series of nuclear agreements that reduced the risk of nuclear conflict. Following the end of the Cold War, however, public attention shifted elsewhere, and progress began to slow. It now appears to be reversing course, as countries build more nuclear weapons, issue more nuclear threats, and abandon previous agreements.

Left to their own, governments are unlikely to make progress to prevent nuclear war. Unless they are pushed by events or the public, they will push it off to the future. One person mattered in the 1950s. One person mattered in the 1980s. And one person matters now.

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The purpose of the project is to provide free, fact-based information and to stimulate conversation about the Russian nuclear issue and the general problem of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, misinformation and disinformation have been spread online about Russia and nuclear weapons.

As a university-based project, we are strong believers in learning and providing an open space for fact-based discussion and analysis. Of course, not all experts agree, so we offer a variety of perspectives on different questions.